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Abstract 
 
The possible role of emotion in anosognosia for hemiplegia (i.e. denial of motor 
deficits contralateral to a brain lesion), has long been debated between 
psychodynamic and neurocognitive theories. However, there are only a handful of 
case studies focusing on this topic, and the precise role of emotion in anosognosia for 
hemiplegia requires empirical investigation. In the present study, we aimed to 
investigate how negative and positive emotions influence motor awareness in 
anosognosia. Positive and negative emotions were induced under carefully-controlled 
experimental conditions in right-hemisphere stroke patients with anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (n = 11) and controls with clinically normal awareness (n = 10). Only the 
negative, emotion induction condition resulted in a significant improvement of motor 
awareness in anosognosic patients compared to controls; the positive emotion 
induction did not. Using lesion overlay and voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping 
approaches, we also investigated the brain lesions associated with the diagnosis of 
anosognosia, as well as with performance on the experimental task. Anatomical areas 
that are commonly damaged in AHP included the right-hemisphere motor and sensory 
cortices, the inferior frontal cortex, and the insula. Additionally, the insula, putamen 
and anterior periventricular white matter were associated with less awareness change 
following the negative emotion induction. This study suggests that motor 
unawareness and the observed lack of negative emotions about one’s disabilities 
cannot be adequately explained by either purely motivational or neurocognitive 
accounts. Instead, we propose an integrative account in which insular and striatal 
lesions result in weak interoceptive and motivational signals.  These deficits lead to 
faulty inferences about the self, involving a difficulty to personalise new sensorimotor 
information, and an abnormal adherence to premorbid beliefs about the body.  
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1. Introduction 
Neurological disturbances of body awareness provide a useful way of investigating 
the bodily self; a fundamental facet of self-consciousness (Gallagher, 2000). 
Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP; i.e. the denial of motor deficits contralateral to a 
brain lesion) is a prototypical example of a disturbance in body awareness. AHP 
occurs more frequently following right perisylvian lesions, and less often following 
left-hemisphere perisylvian lesions (Cocchini, Beschin, Cameron, Fotopoulou & 
Della Sala, 2009). AHP can take various clinical forms, ranging from blatant denial of 
limb paralysis and associated delusional beliefs to milder forms of motor unawareness 
(see Jenkinson, Preston & Ellis, 2010; Marcel, Tegnel & Nimmo-Smith, 2004; 
Fotopoulou, 2014). Although the exact aetiology of AHP remains debated, the clinical 
variability of AHP suggests that it is a multifaceted and heterogeneous phenomenon 
(Marcel et al., 2004; Orfei et al., 2007; Vocat, Staub, Stroppini & Vuilleumier, 2010; 
Fotopoulou, 2014). Accordingly, explanations have varied from selective deficits in 
motor planning, to multi-factorial accounts involving both basic sensorimotor and 
higher-order cognitive deficits (see Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010; Fotopoulou, 2014 
for reviews). These cognitive deficits have been associated with either particular 
lesion sites such as the premotor cortex (Berti et al., 2005) and the insula (Karnath, 
Baier & Nagele, 2005), or involvement of a more varied pattern of cortical and 
subcortical regions and their connections (Fotopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd & 
Kopelman, 2010; Vocat et al., 2010; Moro, Pernigo, Zapparoli, Cordioli & Aglioti, 
2011).    
One facet of AHP that has received less empirical attention, despite a long 
history of clinical observations and theoretical debates (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955; 
Bisiach & Geminani, 1991), is the role of emotional factors. On clinical examination, 
patients typically manifest some degree of blunted affect or ‘indifference’ for their 
paralysis and its consequences. This indifference (anosodiaphoria, Babinski, 1914) 
can exist with or without concomitant explicit denial of deficits.  On the contrary, 
depressive symptoms and ‘catastrophic reactions’ (sudden influx of strong, negative 
feelings and related behaviours; Goldstein, 1939) are encountered rarely. Moreover, 
there are some clinical indications that as unawareness decreases over time, 
depressive symptoms begin to emerge in patients who were previously emotionally 
unresponsive towards their paralysis (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Fotopoulou, 
Rudd, Holmes & Kopelan, 2009; Besharati, Moro & Fotopoulou, in revision). 
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Exceptionally, some patients with or without explicit denial of deficits have been 
noted to show a strong hatred towards their paralysed limbs (misoplegia; Critchley, 
1974), or a disproportionate exasperation with irrelevant, minor disappointments, 
despite their apparent indifference for their paralysis (Weinstein & Kahn, 1950; 
Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Fotopoulou & Conway, 2004).  
Some authors have argued that this lack of affect, or misattribution of negative 
emotions, is caused by purely psychogenic ‘defence’ mechanisms. According to the 
now classic theory of Weinstein and colleagues (e.g. Weinstein, 1991; Weinstein & 
Kahn, 1955), denial and related premorbid coping mechanisms prevent patients from 
explicitly acknowledging their paralysis, and self-attributing the associated negative 
emotions. Alternatively, this lack of emotional reactivity has been considered to be 
the direct consequence of damage to the right (frontal) hemisphere, regarded by some 
authors as specialised for the processing of negative, withdrawal-related emotions 
(Davidson, 2001; see Gainotti, 2012 for review). However, neither of these two 
approaches has been fully supported by empirical evidence. Specifically, the 
psychodynamic account of AHP fails to explain the relative neuroanatomical and 
behavioural specificity of anosognosic behaviours (Bisiach & Geminani, 1991; 
Heilman & Harciarek, 2010). The ‘valence’ hypothesis has similarly not been 
supported in the literature; although patients with AHP do typically score lower than 
control patients in self-report measures of depression and anxiety (e.g. Fotopoulou et 
al., 2010), more sensitive investigations have shown that they do not differ from 
controls groups in their ability to experience such emotions (Turnbull, Evans & 
Owen, 2005; Vocat et al., 2010). They also show appropriate, negative emotional 
reactions to their deficits when the latter are evoked implicitly (Nadrone, Ward, 
Fotopoulou & Turnbull, 2007; Fotopoulou et al., 2010). Thus, it appears that the 
relation between AHP and emotion is more complex than suggested by either the 
psychodynamic or the valence hypothesis.  
More generally, such rigid distinctions between purely psychodynamic and 
neurocognitive explanations have been challenged recently (Fotopoulou, 2012) and 
integrative accounts of AHP have been put forward (Vuilleumier, 2004; Turnbull et 
al., 2005; Turnbull & Solms, 2007; Fotopoulou, 2010; see also Turnbull, Fotopoulou 
& Solms, this volume). According to such theories, complex imbalances between 
cognition and motivation may be caused directly by damage to insular, striatal, or 
limbic regions that have recently been found to be selectively associated with AHP 
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(Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Vocat et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). For example, 
Vuilleumier and colleagues have suggested that damage to the basal ganglia may 
obstruct the “discovery” of deficits, as patients have reduced affective drive to 
respond to errors and revise beliefs based on new perceptual evidence (Vuilleumier, 
2000, 2004; Vocat et al., 2012). Similarly, within a computational framework, 
Fotopoulou and colleagues have suggested that insular and basal ganglia damage may 
lead to weak and imprecise signals about the physiological condition of one’s body. 
This leads to aberrant ‘top-down’ inferences about bodily states, and difficulties in 
affectively personalising new sensorimotor information (Fotopoulou, 2014). 
Taken together, these accounts suggest that the lack or misattribution of 
negative emotions in AHP relates to impairments in higher-order cognition, rather 
than to primary deficits in emotional processing. This ‘top-down’ perspective is 
consistent with a relatively neglected facet of AHP, namely, the fluctuations of 
awareness based on the emotional or social context in which awareness is probed. For 
instance, Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000, see also Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen, 
2002; Ross & Rush, 1981; Starkstein & Robinson, 1988) have shown that when 
themes of loss are explored during psychotherapeutic sessions – particularly when 
such loss is apparently unrelated to their disabilities – transient awareness and 
depressive episodes can be experienced by patients that are otherwise stably 
anosognosic. Marcel and colleagues (2004) have further shown that awareness may 
increase in some patients when they are asked about their disabilities in an emotional, 
conspiratory manner, or from the perspective of the examiner (see also Fotopoulou et 
al., 2009, 2011; Fotopoulou, 2014). Notwithstanding the theoretical interest of these 
observations, to our knowledge there is no systematic, experimental investigation of 
the moderating role of emotional and social context in AHP.  
Accordingly, we aimed to investigate the relation between emotion and motor 
awareness in AHP. To this end, we recruited right-hemisphere stroke patients with 
AHP and control patients without AHP, and assessed motor awareness before and 
after providing positive and negative feedback about performance on a standardised 
cognitive test (the Hayling Test; Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The task includes 
components of varied difficulty that we could match with the valence of the provided 
feedback to generate realistic conditions of positive and negative feedback. Moreover, 
it is unrelated to motor abilities so we could test the role of emotion on motor 
awareness, uncomplicated by ‘bottom-up’ sensorimotor signals and the 
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patients’explicit or implicit feelings about their motor abilities. Based on the idea that 
patients with AHP have lost the ability to use signals from their own body to make 
related inferences about their current bodily state (Fotopoulou, 2014; see also above), 
our main aim was to test whether the ‘top-down’ experimental induction (by verbal, 
social feedback) of negative feelings about oneself could improve awareness of one’s 
motor disabilities. We expected patients with AHP to show increased awareness of 
their deficits following negative feedback compared with positive feedback, while 
such effects were not expected in the control group. Furthermore, in order to ensure 
that the experimental feedback had induced the desired emotions in patients, we 
measured patients’ self-reported emotional state following each condition of the main 
task. If patients with AHP were capable of experiencing negative emotions, we 
expected negative feedback to lead to more negative feelings than positive feedback 
in both patient groups.   
Lastly, we examined whether lesions to critical cortical (premotor and the 
insular cortex) and subcortical (basal ganglia and limbic structures) areas would be 
associated with increased unawareness scores, as in previous studies (Berti et al., 
2005; Karnath, Baier & Nagele, 2005; Fotopoulou, et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). 
Contrary to such lesion subtraction investigations, however, we used a voxel-based 
lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) approach (Bates et al, 2003; Rorden, Karnath & 
Bonilha, 2007). This advanced method characterises the statistical relationship 
between tissue damage and behaviour on a voxel-by-voxel basis, regardless of the 
classification of patients into categorical groups, or implementing a cut-off for 
pathology (Bates et al, 2003). We also used this method to identify the brain regions 
associated with a change in motor awareness induced by our experimental task, which 
according to our hypothesis should include the insular cortex and basal ganglia 
structures (Fotopoulou, 2014; see also above). While the first clinico-anatomical 
correlation has been investigated before in the literature, to our knowledge, only two 
previous studies have investigated the association between behaviour on carefully-
controlled experimental conditions and neuroanatomical data (Fotopoulou et al., 
2010; Moro et al., 2011), and no study has examined this association in relation to 
emotion.  
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2. Methods 
2.1. Patients 
Twenty-five, adult neurological patients with right-hemisphere lesions were recruited 
from consecutive admissions to an acute, stroke-rehabilitation ward. Inclusion criteria 
were: (i) right-hemisphere lesion as confirmed by clinical neuroimaging; (ii) 
contralateral hemiplegia; and (iii) < 4 months from symptom onset. Exclusion criteria 
were: (i) previous history of neurological or psychiatric illness; (ii) <7 years of 
education; (iii) medication with severe cognitive or mood side-effects; (iv) language 
impairments that precluded completion of the study assessments. Of the initial 25 
patients screened, nine could not be tested due to time constraints (n = 4), fatigue or 
poor concentration (n = 3), and early discharge (n = 2). Thus, a total of 16 patients 
took part in the study (nine women; mean age = 68.19, SD = 14.27 years, age range: 
41-88). Two additional sets of patients were recruited subsequently in order to test 
(see section 2.4): (i) a control condition in which the order of experimental conditions 
was reversed (n=2; two women with AHP, 82 and 90 years of age); and (ii) the 
specificity of the effect to motor awareness (n=3; two patients without AHP, 57-year-
old male and 70-year-old female, and one female AHP patient, 84 years of age). The 
study was approved by the local NHS Ethics Committee. 
 
2.2. Assessment of anosognosia and associated disorders  
Eight of the 16 patients were classified as having AHP (four women; mean age = 
71.63, SD=16.18 years, age range: 41-88) and eight were classified as right-
hemisphere controls (HP group; five women; mean age = 64.75, SD =12.14 years, age 
range: 47-78). This classification was based on the Berti et al. (1996) interview, 
which includes general questions (e.g. ‘why are you in the hospital?’), followed by 
specific questions regarding motor ability (e.g. ‘Can you move your left arm?’), and 
‘confrontation’ questions (e.g. ‘Please touch my hand with your left hand. Have you 
done it?’). The interview is scored on a 3-point scale (2 = denial of motor impairment 
and failure to reach the examiners hand; 1 = denial of motor impairment, but admits 
to failure to reach examiner hand; and 0 = full acknowledgment of motor deficits), 
with patients scoring 1 or 2 categorised as anosognosic. The Feinberg et al. (2000) 
scale was used as a secondary measure of unawareness. The scale consists of 10 items 
including general self-report items (e.g. ‘Do you have any weakness anywhere?’) and 
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task-related items (e.g. ‘Please try and move your left arm for me. Did you move it?’). 
Responses were scored by the examiner for each item (0 = completely aware, 0.5 = 
partially unaware, and 1 = complete unawareness), and summed to produce an overall 
‘Feinberg awareness score’ (0 = complete awareness, 10 = complete unawareness). 
Finally, body ownership disturbances such as asomatognosia (the inability to 
recognise one’s own body; Cutting, 1978) and somatoparaphrenia (body ownership 
delusions; Gerstman 1942) were assessed using the Cutting (1978) questionnaire. 
Two AHP patients exhibited disturbances of body ownership: one patient manifested 
somatoparaphrenia (believing that her left arm belonged to her friend), and the other 
asomatognosia. No other somatic delusions were noted in either group. 
 
2.3. Neurological and Neuropsychological Assessment 
Motor strength of the upper and lower limbs was assessed using the Medical Research 
Council scale (MRC; Guarantors of Brain, 1986). Premorbid intelligence was 
assessed using the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2001). Orientation in 
time, space and person, as well as general cognitive functioning, was assessed using 
the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975). 
Working memory was assessed using the digit span task from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale III (Wechsler, 1998). Long-term verbal recall was assessed using 
the 5-item test from the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA; Nasreddine, 2005). 
Proprioception was assessed with eyes closed by applying small, vertical, controlled 
movements to three joints (middle finger, wrist and elbow), at three time intervals 
(correct responses were rated as 0 and incorrect ones as 1) (Vocat et al., 2010). The 
customary ‘confrontation’ technique was administered to test visual fields and tactile 
extinction (Bisiach et al., 1986). Five subtests of the Behavioural Inattention Test 
(BIT; Wilson, Cockborn & Halligan, 1987; line crossing, star cancellation, copy, 
representational drawing and line bisection) were employed to assess unilateral, 
visuospatial neglect. Personal neglect was assessed using the ‘one item test’ (Bisiach, 
Vallar, Perani, Papani & Berti, 1986), and the ‘comb/razor’ test (McIntoch et al., 
2000). Executive and reasoning abilities were assessed using the Frontal Assessment 
Battery (FAB; Dubois et al., 2000), and the Cognitive Estimates test (Shallice & 
Evans, 1978). The Hospital Depression and Anxiety Scale (HADS; Zigmind & 
Snaith, 1983), was used to assess depression and anxiety.  
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2.4. Experimental Study Design  
Our main experimental aim was to induce positive and negative emotions in patients 
with AHP and HP controls, and assess their effects on motor awareness. To this end, 
we administered a standardised cognitive task, the Hayling Sentence Completion Test 
of executive functioning (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), which entails two similar tasks 
varying in difficulty. Namely, a simple, sentence completion task (measuring 
processing speed), and a more difficult sentence completion task, in which patients 
have to provide responses that are unrelated to the meaning of the sentences 
(measuring inhibition of automatic responses). Healthy controls and particularly 
neurological populations are known to perform faster on the first task, and with fewer 
errors, compared with the second task (Burgess & Shallice, 1997; see Results section 
below for confirmation of this result in our sample). In order to ensure the induction 
of positive and negative feelings respectively, we further manipulated the explicit, 
verbal feedback provided by the experimenter after each trial: positive feedback was 
provided following trials of the easy task, and negative feedback was provided 
following trials of the difficult task. Hence, feedback could be administered 
‘realistically’ and ensure construct validity. This feedback manipulation can be 
understood as a mood induction procedure (Nummenmaa & Niemi, 2004), widely 
used in psychological research, including with neurological patients (e.g. Mograbi et 
al., 2012). The induced emotions are considered short lived and within the normal 
daily range of emotional experience for most people (Frost & Green, 1982; Isen & 
Gorgoglione, 1983; Martin, 1990). This was confirmed in this sample at debriefing 
(see procedures section below). 
The experiment had a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Emotion: positive vs. 
negative feedback) mixed factorial design, with Emotion as the within-subjects factor. 
Due to the nature and the standardised administration order of the Hayling Test (Part 
1: the easier sentence completion task is followed by Part 2: the harder sentence 
completion task) positive feedback preceded negative feedback in our experiment. 
Thus, to examine possible order effects, we also conducted a control experiment in 
two additionally recruited AHP patients, in whom we reversed the order of positive 
and negative feedback (i.e. first administering Section 2 with negative feedback, and 
then Section 1 with positive feedback).  
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Finally, in order to determine the specificity of the emotion induction on 
motor awareness we conducted an additional control experiment with three right-
hemisphere damaged patients. The experimental procedure was identical to the above, 
with the exception of additional pre-and-post measures to assess any changes in 
visuospatial neglect, personal neglect, and anosognosia for drawing neglect, in 
addition to motor awareness. Specifically, changes in neglect were assessed by 
administering the copy, line bisection and star cancellation subtests of the BIT 
(Wilson et al., 1987) and the ‘one-item test’ (Bisiach et al., 1987) pre-and-post the 
positive and negative emotion induction. Four additional questions were added to the 
motor awareness questionnaire (please see below) to assess awareness of drawing 
neglect (Berti, Ladavas & Corte, 1996). Referring to their performance on the ‘copy’ 
subtest of the BIT (administered before the experiment; Wilson et al., 1987) patients 
were asked: (i) two general questions (e.g. “Are you happy with your drawing of the 
Daisy?” and “ Are the daisies alike?”); and (ii) to provide subjective ratings of their 
drawing performance using a 11-point Likert-type scale (e.g. “Using this scale from 
0-10, how good is the drawing, 0 being not good at all and 10 being very good?” and 
“Using this scale from 0-10, how alike are the drawings, 0 being not at all alike and 
10 being exactly the same?”). 
 
2.5. Measures 
The primary dependent variable was ‘awareness change’, which was based on a motor 
awareness questionnaire, developed based on pre-existing, validated measures (e.g. 
Berti et al., 1996; Marcel et al., 2004), and administered immediately before and after 
each Emotion condition. Previous studies have suggested that AHP patients may 
‘learn’ the ‘correct’ responses to answers on awareness measures when repeatedly 
administered (Marcel et al., 2004). To avoid such repetition confounds, four 
equivalent versions of the questionnaire were developed. Each version comprised 
seven items, covering four domains: (i) two general awareness questions (e.g. “Do 
you have any weakness anywhere?”); (ii) one question related to left unimanual 
ability, followed by a ‘confrontation’ and ‘check’ question (e.g.  “Can you wave to 
me with your left hand? Please do it for me now. Have you done it?”); (iii) one 
question concerning bimanual action ability, each followed by confrontation and 
check questions (e.g. “Can you tie a knot? Please do it for me now. Have you done 
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it?”), and (iv) one bipedal awareness question (e.g. “Can you climb a ladder?”). Each 
question was scored according to the method of Feinberg et al. (2000): 0 = awareness; 
0.5 = partial awareness; and 1.0 = unawareness; therefore, higher scores indicated 
greater unawareness (range = 0-7). For each Emotion condition (i.e. positive and 
negative feedback), we subtracted the post-induction awareness score from the pre-
induction awareness score of each patient, to obtain a main measure of awareness 
change. 
Additionally, in order to evaluate the effects of emotional feedback on 
patients’ emotional state per se, patients were asked to provide a subjective rating of 
their current emotional state on a 6-point Likert-type scale (i.e. “Using this scale from 
zero to five, zero being very unhappy and five being very happy, how do you feel 
right now?”). The scale was read aloud to patients and also presented visually as a 
vertical scale on an A4 sheet of paper (0 at the bottom and 5 at the top), positioned in 
the patient’s right visual field in order to minimise possible unilateral visual neglect 
effects. Patients were familiarised with the rating scale before the experiment. 
2.6. Procedures  
The experiment was organised into two phases: [i] administration of Hayling Test 
Part 1 (simple sentence completion) with positive feedback, and [ii] administration of 
Hayling Test Part 2 (inhibition of automatic response) with negative feedback. These 
were conducted in a single session, separated by a 30-minute interval, during which 
standard neuropsychological tests (see above) were administered without feedback. 
Part 1 of the Hayling Test requires the patient to complete a series of sentences with 
the last word missing from it as fast as possible (e.g. “The rich child attended a 
private…”, response: school). The response and reaction time are recorded and the 
total time score is converted into a scaled score. In part 2, the patient is again asked to 
complete a series of sentences as above, but their response is to be completely 
unconnected to the sentence (e.g. “London is a very busy…”, possible response: 
banana). The response and the reaction time are recorded, and the total time and 
response errors are converted into a scaled score. 
Positive feedback was provided in a standardised manner, using one of the 
following seven statements, in a pseudorandomised order: (i) “Well done”, (ii) “That 
is correct”, (iii) “Your answer was very quick”, (iv) “Excellent work”, (v) “You are 
doing so well on this task”, (vi) “Very impressive”, and (vii) “Your performance has 
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been excellent so far”. Positive feedback was matched to performance as much as 
possible, i.e. most answers were correct and given within one minute and hence one 
of the above statements was provided. In the unlikely event that an answer was 
wrong, statement (iii) was provided; or, if an answer was very slow (more than one 
minute), this statement was not used and one of the other statements were provided. 
We wish to highlight that, although this feedback was realistic in all cases, it was pre-
selected and false in the sense that it did not correspond to the norms of the Hayling 
Test.  
Similarly, negative feedback was provided using one of the following seven 
standard statements: . (i) “That is incorrect”, (ii) “You are not doing very well on this 
task”, (iii) “Your performance has been very poor so far”, (iv) “That is the wrong 
answer”, (v) “You are doing poorly so far”, (vi) “Your answer was too slow”, and (vi) 
“You are not performing very well”. Feedback was consistent with patients’ actual 
performance as much as possible (in the same manner as above, but matched to the 
poor performance of patients). 
Measures of awareness were taken immediately before (i.e. pre-induction 
awareness) and after (i.e. post-induction awareness) the two parts of the task. The 
emotion rating scale was completed after each post-induction awareness 
questionnaire, in order not to influence the latter. During the control experiment, the 
procedures were identical to the above, except for reversing the order of phases one 
and two. 
Patients were carefully and fully debriefed following completion of the 
experiment; the purpose of the positive and negative feedback were fully explained, 
and any questions were addressed. It was stressed that the feedback provided did not 
reflect of their actual performance on the Hayling Task, as determined by the 
available, standardised norms, or by the face value impressions the task itself might 
generate. Any ongoing emotional distress (if experienced) was fully discussed and 
reflected upon to ensure that the patients’ emotional state was stable. There were no 
particularly strong reactions during the experiment, or following debriefing, and none 
of the patients reported having guessed or suspected the manipulation. 
 
2.7. Statistical Analysis 
All behavioural analyses were conducted in Stata 11 (StataCorp, 2011). Independent 
samples t-tests were used to analyse mean differences between groups on 
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neuropsychological tests. Items that were not normally distributed were also analysed 
using the non-parametric equivalent (Mann-Whitney U test) to confirm our findings 
(see supplementary materials).  
 
Analysis of Main Experiment. The differential ‘awareness change’ scores (see 
Measures) were used as the outcome measure in all analyses, which were conducted 
using multiple linear regression. The awareness change data were not normally 
distributed, hence we applied bootstrapping with 1000 repetitions (bootstrapping 
makes no assumption as to the distribution of the data; Guan, W., 2003); bootstrapped 
standard errors (SE) are therefore reported. The same analysis was also run while co-
varying for overall negative mood (HADS depression scores, as these were found to 
differ between the groups, see below). Preliminary examination of the awareness 
change data identified one HP control patient scoring more than two SD above the 
group mean, and hence this patient was removed from subsequent experimental 
analyses as an outlier.  
 
Analysis of Control Variables. A multiple linear regression (as above) on emotion 
ratings was used to investigate whether patients experienced a change in their 
emotional state in the two feedback conditions. The same analysis was also run while 
co-varying for overall negative mood (HADS depression scores). Furthermore, to 
ensure there was no difference in the baseline awareness scores preceding the positive 
and negative feedback conditions (particularly given the fixed order of the task), we 
conducted non-parametric tests comparing the baseline awareness scores preceding 
the positive and the negative feedback conditions in each group. In addition, we also 
compared between groups the total scaled scores of the Hayling Sentence Completion 
test, as well as the scaled scores for Part 1 and 2, to ensure the actual performance of 
both groups was consistent with the task’s expected difficulty levels, and that the 
provided feedback was realistic and of similar relevance to both groups. Additionally, 
modified t-tests (SINGLIMS_ES; Crawford, 2010; Crawford et al., 2002; Crawford et 
al., 1998) were used to determine whether the awareness change scores of the two 
AHP patients in the reverse-order experiment (see section 2.4) differed significantly 
from those of the HP group. Finally, in order to investigate whether any changes in 
awareness resulting from the experiment had a lasting effect, non-parametric tests 
were used to compare Feinberg awareness scores acquired on initial assessment (prior 
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to the experimental session) with those obtained 1-3 days after the experiment was 
conducted.  
 
2.8. Lesion analysis methods  
Routinely acquired clinical CT (n = 10) and MRI (n = 5) data sets were obtained 
within the first week of admission [admission to neuroimaging interval: mean = 4.26 
days, SD = 4.88 days]. The clinical data set of one HP control patient was unavailable 
and the patient was therefore excluded from further imaging analyses. Available 
structural data were converted into software-readable formats for further processing. 
To facilitate comparison between the clinical data and a standard space template, we 
manually reoriented the native structural scan of each patient to the origin of the 
template using SPM (Statistical Parametric Mapping, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Lesions were then reconstructed onto the MNI 
(Montreal Neurological Institute) template provided within MRIcron 
(http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/) whilst using all available 
clinical scans to guide the delineation. Lesions were mapped by two researchers, who 
were blind to group classification and the behavioural scores of the patients.  
In a first step, lesion volume was obtained. Subsequently, percentage lesion 
overlay maps for both groups, AHP and HP, were computed in FSL (FMRIB 
Software Library, http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/). In a second step, a lesion 
difference map between both groups was computed.  
The classical voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) approach (Bates 
et al., 2003; Rorden, et al. 2007) as implemented in the software package NPM (non-
parametric mapping; http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/npm/) (Karnath et al., 2004; 
Rorden and Karnath, 2004) was used to identify anatomical regions associated with: i) 
the presence of anosognosia (Feinberg awareness scores, inverted to adhere with the 
NPM prerequisite of the directionality of the input data) and ii) the awareness change 
induced by the experimental design (‘change in awareness’ scores). Results were 
calculated with the permutated non-parametric Brunner-Menzel test to correct for 
multiple comparison and small sample size (Rorden et al., 2007; Volle et al., 2011). 
Results were then projected onto a high-resolution template (Holmes et al., 1998) in 
MNI standard space using MRIcron. 
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3. Results  
3.1. Demographic and Neuropsychological Results 
Patients’ demographic characteristics and their performance on standardised 
neuropsychological tests are summarised in Table 1. The groups did not differ 
significantly in terms of age, education or symptom onset to assessment interval. As 
expected, there was a significant difference in awareness scores between the AHP and 
HP groups on both the Berti et al. (1996) interview (t(14) = 5.60, p = 0.00) and the 
Feinberg et al. (2000) scale (t(14) = 7.06, p = 0.00). The groups showed similar 
sensory deficits, as well as similar impairments in general cognitive functioning, 
abstract thinking, reasoning abilities and neglect. Although both groups showed 
deficits in proprioception, the AHP group was significantly more impaired (t (12) = 
2.33, p = 0.04). The AHP group showed significantly lower scores for depression on 
the HADS when compared to controls (t (14) = 3.06, p = 0.01). This difference was 
taken into account in subsequent analyses. 
 
 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
3.2. Main experimental results: Awareness Change 
A linear regression analysis revealed a significant main effect for the factor Group (b 
= 2.04, SE = -0.45, p < 0.001, 95% CI = 1.16; 2.92), with the AHP group showing a 
greater change in awareness (marginal mean = 0.99) compared with the HP group 
(marginal mean = -0.02). Also, a significant main effect of Emotion induction type (b 
= –1.07, SE = 0.46, p = 0.019, CI = –1.96; -0.18) was observed, with awareness 
change being significantly greater following the negative (marginal mean=1.6) 
compared with the positive emotional induction (marginal mean =  –0.57). The 
interaction between Emotion induction type and Group was also significant (b= –
2.05, SE = 0.61, p = 0.001, CI: –3.26; –0.84; see Figure 1), with the AHP group 
(marginal mean = 2.55) showing a greater change in awareness compared with the HP 
group (marginal mean = 0.75) following the negative emotional induction only. 
Taking the HADS depression scores into account in this analysis did not change the 
pattern of these results.  
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 A qualitative example of the change in motor awareness observed as a result 
of the emotion induction is described here.  During the pre-awareness assessment one 
patient stated “No, I have no weakness anywhere, no”, claiming that “I can move my 
arm, no problem” and was adamant that she raised her left arm and clapped her hands. 
Following the negative emotion induction, the same patient admitted that her left arm 
“is not as strong as before the stroke”, saying “I don’t think I can move this arm now, 
it feels weak”. When asked if she can tie a knot, she replied “I’m not so sure now” 
and after attempting the action, she observed “no, I can’t do that.”  
 
 [Please insert Figure 1 here] 
 
3.3. Emotional State Induction 
To investigate whether patients experienced a change in their emotional state 
following the positive and negative induction respectively, we examined the main 
effects of Emotion (positive vs. negative feedback) and Group (AHP vs. HP) on 
emotion ratings. The regression analysis confirmed a main effect of Emotion (b = 
1.83, SE = 0.439, p < 0.001, CI: 0.97; 2.69) with patients giving significantly lower 
emotion ratings (i.e. reporting feeling less happy) following the negative emotional 
induction (marginal mean = 2.17) compared with the positive emotional induction 
(marginal mean = 3.83). The model also showed that the factor Group significantly 
predicted emotion ratings (b = 0.99, SE = 0.49, p = 0.046, CI: 0.019; 1.97), with AHP 
patients showing more positive emotion ratings (marginal mean = 3.41) compared 
with right-hemisphere controls (marginal means = 2.59). However, there was no 
significant interaction between the factors induction type and group (b = –0.33, SE = 
0.64, p = 0.6, CI: -1.59; 0.93; see Figure 2). 
 
[Please insert Figure 2 here] 
 
3.4. Baseline Awareness Scores  
A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test revealed that there was no significant difference 
between pre-awareness scores of the positive (median = 2) and of the negative 
condition overall (median = 3, Z = –0.27, p = 0.82, r = 0.067). This applied also to the 
AHP group (Z = –0.9, p = 0.563, r = 0.23) and the HP group (Z = –0.7, p = 0.75, r = 
0.18), in respective, separate analyses. 
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3.5. Performance on the Hayling Test 
Analysis of the Hayling Sentence Completion Test using a Mann-Whitney U test 
showed no significant difference between total scaled scores of the AHP and HP 
groups (Z = –1.14, p = 0.28, r = 0.29). According to the tests norms, overall scaled 
scores indicated that the AHP group’s performance was ‘low average’ (median = 4), 
while the HP group’s performance was ‘moderate average’ (median = 5). Similarly, 
there was no difference found in Hayling part 1 (Z = –0.9, p = 0.42, r = 0.23), with the 
scaled score for completion time being ‘low average’ for the AHP group (median = 4) 
and ‘moderate average’ for the HP group (median = 5). This again applied to Hayling 
part 2, with no difference found between groups in their total scaled score for 
completion time (Z = –0.4, p = 0.8, r = 0.1) and response errors (Z = –1.1, p = 0.31, r 
= 0.28), with the AHP group performing ‘average’ for time (median = 6) and 
‘abnormal’ for response errors (median = 1.5). Similarly, the HP group performed 
‘average’ for time (median = 6) and ‘abnormal’ for responses errors (median = 2) (see 
supplementary materials). Therefore, the feedback given was realistic based on 
patients’ actual performance, with both groups performing better on part 1 than on 
part 2, and showing no differences between groups on either part. 
 
3.6. Reverse order control condition  
The two AHP patients who performed the experiment in the reverse order showed the 
same pattern of results as found in the main group analysis. After the negative 
emotion induction, both patients showed a greater improvement in awareness 
(AHP09: mean = 5, AHP10:  mean = 3.5) compared to the control group (mean = 0.5; 
SD = 0.82; AHP09: t(7) = 5.13, p = 0.001, r = 5.49; AHP10: t(7) = 3,42, p = 0.007, r 
= 3.66). There was no difference between either AHP patient and the HP control 
group in awareness change following positive emotion induction (AHP09: t(7) = 0.45, 
p = 0.33, r = 0.48; and AHP10: t(7) = 1.7, p = 0.07, r = 1.81).  
 
3.7. Specificity of effect control condition 
The three patients with right-hemisphere damage who performed this additional 
control experiment showed no change in personal neglect assessments, and a minor 
change in visuospatial neglect, with extrapersonal neglect becoming slightly worse 
following negative versus positive induction in two patients. Additionally, there was a 
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non-mood specific improvement in awareness of neglect in one patient. The results 
are summarised in 3 case reports below (see supplementary materials Table S2 for a 
summary of results).  
Patient HP09 presented with no AHP, no personal neglect, no visuospatial neglect 
except on the ‘copy’ subtest, and mild unawareness of drawing neglect. There was no 
change in visuospatial and personal neglect, or awareness of drawing neglect 
following the positive and negative emotion induction condition.  Patient HP10 
presented with no AHP, mild personal neglect, visuospatial neglect and unawareness 
of drawing neglect. She showed no change in the line bisection subtest, personal 
neglect scores, and general questions for awareness of drawing neglect, but a small 
increase in visuospatial neglect following the positive and negative emotion induction 
conditions. There was also a small increase in awareness of drawing neglect following 
the negative emotion induction, but a much larger increase in awareness following 
positive induction. Lastly, patient AHP11 presented with AHP, personal neglect, 
visuospatial neglect and mild unawareness of drawing neglect. There was no change 
in her personal neglect and awareness of drawing neglect scores, and no change in her 
performance on the line bisection subtest following the negative and positive emotion 
inductions. There was a small increase in visuospatial neglect (star cancellation 
subtest) following the negative but not positive emotion induction.” 
3.8. Follow-up awareness testing  
Wilcoxon signed rank tests showed that there was no significant difference in 
Feinberg awareness scores before and after the experiment, in either the AHP (Z = –
0.45, p = 0.66, r = 0.12) or HP group (Z = –1.63, p = 0.1, r = 0.42), suggesting that 
the observed awareness changes were temporary and experimental effects, rather than 
permanent, clinical changes.  
 
3.9. Lesion Analysis  
All lesions resulted from a first-ever unilateral stroke, mainly within the right middle 
cerebral artery territory. Group-level percentage lesion overlay for the AHP group (n 
= 8) identified the involvement of cortical and subcortical areas, comprising the 
inferior and superior frontal gyri, the pericentral cortex, the insula and insula ribbon, 
and the internal capsule (see Figure 3A). In comparison, the lesion overlap map for 
the HP group (n = 7) revealed a more focal lesion pattern involving mainly 
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subcortical regions (see Figure 3B). Lesion volume (defined by number of voxels) 
was not significantly different between the AHP group (mean = 37132.5, SD = 
43782.65) and the HP group (mean = 25997.14, SD = 33536.03; t (15) = 0.55, p = 
0.594). The lesion subtraction map identified mainly the anterior and posterior insular 
ribbon, the posterior basal ganglia, and dorsal pericentral areas to differ between the 
groups (see Figure 3C). 
 
[Please insert Figure 3 here] 
 
VLSM analysis using the continuous Feinberg awareness scores, revealed that 
voxels within the posterior insula, the supramarginal, the angular and superior 
temporal gyrus (SMG, AG and STG), internal capsule, pericentral gyri, and the 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) were significantly associated with differences in 
awareness (p<0.05) (see Figure 4A). Similar results were found when co-varying 
lesion size. Additionally, VLSM analysis, looking at the experimental change in 
awareness scores (i.e. differential scores following negative emotional induction 
only), without and with co-variation of lesion size, identified significant voxels 
(p<0.05) within the anterior arm of the internal capsule, the anterior insula, the 
anterior lateral putamen with a lateral extension into the external capsule and an 
additional region in the dorsal anterior periventricular white matter (likely to contain 
limbic white matter connections) (see Figure 4B).  
 
[Please insert Figure 4 here] 
 
4. Discussion  
In the present study, we experimentally induced positive and negative emotions in 
patients with AHP and HP controls, and measured the resulting changes in motor 
awareness. We also investigated the brain lesions associated with the clinical 
diagnosis of AHP, as well as with performance on our experimental task. The main 
behavioural finding was that patients with AHP showed a significant improvement in 
motor awareness following a negative, but not a positive, emotion induction. The 
main finding of the analysis combining experimental and lesion data was that lesions 
to the putamen, the anterior insula, the capsules and the anterior periventricular white 
20	  	  
matter were associated with less awareness improvement on our experimental task. 
These findings are discussed in turn below. 
To our knowledge, this is the first experimental demonstration of the role of 
emotion in AHP. Our results show that negative, self-referential emotion induced by 
social feedback can lead to temporary improvements in motor awareness, in patients 
who otherwise show stable AHP. These results are consistent with previous clinical 
observations of transitory awareness improvements and ‘catastrophic reactions’ 
following discussions of negative themes such as loss, separation or mortality 
(Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000). They are also consistent with experimental 
manipulations of perspective-taking, in which taking a third person perspective of 
one’s disability can lead to awareness improvements and increase of depressive 
emotions (Marcel et al., 2004; Fotopoulou et al., 2009; 2011). We believe these 
results cannot be accounted for by either the psychodynamic or ‘valence’ hypothesis 
(see Introduction), and instead are best explained by theories that assume ‘top-down’, 
emotional abnormalities (Vuillemier, 2004; Turnbull et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 
2010; 2014). Moreover, although we tested changes to neglect and unawareness for 
neglect following emotion induction in only a small subset of patients, it appears that 
the effects of negative emotion on awareness are specific to motor awareness and do 
not extend to neglect or its unawareness. We discuss these findings and their potential 
interpretations in turn below.  
While our results could be interpreted as psychodynamic ‘lifting’ of denial and 
repression, the psychodynamic hypothesis could just as easily predict the opposite 
result, namely a defensive, decrease of awareness due to the negative emotions 
experienced following negative feedback. Thus, the predictions of this theory in 
relation to our results are not clear. Similarly, although patients with AHP showed 
significantly less depressive feelings and symptoms than controls on a self-report 
measure (see also Fotopoulou et al., 2010), our experimental results could not be 
accounted for by the ‘valence’ hypothesis. This is because patients with AHP showed 
greater awareness changes following the negative emotion induction, suggesting that 
they were able to process such emotions at some level. Indeed, both groups reported 
feeling more negative emotions following negative versus positive feedback in a 
‘manipulation check’ measure. Interestingly, during the experiment, patients with 
AHP reported feeling overall more positive emotion than control patients, but this 
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effect was unrelated to the valence of the feedback provided. This may relate to the 
aforementioned, more general tendency of patients with AHP to report (rather than 
experience) less negative emotions (see also Turnbull et al., 2005). Thus, as our 
patients were able to experience increased negative emotions following the negative 
emotion induction and increased positive emotions following the positive emotion 
induction, our results suggest that their emotional difficulties do not consist of a 
primary deficit in emotional processing (as the valence hypothesis suggests). Instead, 
as their emotional difficulties seem to relate more specifically to their motor 
awareness (see also above), they may be suffering from a more specific, higher-order 
impairment in consciously, self-attributing negative emotions, i.e. attributing negative 
emotions to at least some of their higher-order self-representations (see also 
Fotopoulou, 2010; Turnbull et al., 2005).  
This interpretation is also supported by the findings of our lesion mapping 
analysis. Specifically, the presence (lesion overlay results) and severity (Feinberg 
VLSM results) of anosognosia were associated with lesions to a range of cortical and 
subcortical areas previously associated with AHP (Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et al., 
2005; Vocat et al., 2010; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). However, worse 
performance on the critical condition of our experimental task (i.e. less awareness 
change following negative feedback) was associated with lesions to the putamen, the 
anterior insula, the capsules and the anterior periventricular white matter.  
The insula, and particularly its anterior sectors, is increasingly identified as the 
neural substrate for the conscious representational of internal bodily signals 
(interoception; Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2009), as well as for the processing of 
salience (Seeley et al., 2007). Thus, in patients with AHP, damage to the right insula 
and related white matter connections may be linked with impoverished interoceptive 
signals about the left-side of the body (see also Karnath et al. 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 
2010). We speculate that this deficit may affect how patients process the salience and 
emotional significance of signals arising in this body side, thus explaining how they 
can remain in denial of their paralysis and/or apathetic towards the normally alarming 
sight of a paralysed left arm (Romano, Gandola, Bottini, & Maravita, 2014). 
Similarly, the functional role of the basal ganglia and particularly the striatum has 
been associated with prediction error-driven learning (O’Doherty et al., 2003), as well 
as the aberrant salience theories of psychosis (Gray et al., 1991; Kapur, 2003). In 
AHP such deficits can be linked with both specific instances of aberrant motor 
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monitoring in functionally specialised systems (Berti et al., 2005), or more generally 
in global error monitoring, salience processing and belief updating (Venneri & 
Shanks, 2004; Davies et al., 2005; Vocat et al., 2012). For example, according to a 
probabilistic, predictive coding theory of AHP (Fotopoulou, 2012; 2014), such lesions 
could be understood to disrupt neuromodulatory circuits in AHP, leading for example 
to dopamine-depletion and a difficulty in optimising the precision (uncertainty) of 
prediction errors (Friston et al., 2012), affecting their salience and, ultimately, the 
learning of new information. Thus, even when signals about the current state of the 
body may be available, they may be ‘imprecise’, and thus unable to update prior 
beliefs about the self. This ultimately leads to aberrant inferences about one’s current 
abilities and abnormal adherence to past beliefs about the body.  
We can thus speculate that in AHP patients who fail to update their emotions 
and beliefs about their current state of the body (i.e. their left-sided paralysis), the 
provision of negative feedback by social means can generate negative emotions about 
the self and new learning on the basis of other intact areas. Future studies will be 
needed to verify this prediction, perhaps using functional neuroimaging to detect 
residual emotional processing in AHP patients. In addition, given the potential 
specificity of our effects (concerning motor but not spatial awareness), future studies 
should explore the psychological and neural relation between emotional processing 
and the motor system. Indeed, a growing literature is suggesting a tight interrelation 
between emotion and motor representations (see Pereira, 2011; Gentsch, & Synofzik, 
submitted for reviews). Consistent with the current findings, previous studies have 
shown that while negative emotional processing competes for attentional resources 
with visual tasks to the detriment of performance on the latter  (Hartikainen, Ogawa,& 
Knight, 2000; Tipples &Sharma, 2000; Erthal et al.,2005), they may enhance 
processing in motor-related brain areas.  Indeed, several studies of non-human 
primates have found the involvement of motor-related cortical areas during 
threatening contexts (e.g., Graziano & Cooke, 2006), while emotional threat has been 
found to be associated with increased motor cortex excitability in humans 
(Baumgartner, Willi, & Jäncke, 2007; Hajcak et al., 2007; Oliveri et al., 2003). 
Induction of fear has been found to modulate activity in primary motor cortex and 
putamen (Butler et al., 2007; Phelps et al., 2001). These findings have been 
interpreted in contemporary theories of emotion as consistent with the idea that 
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may protect the organism from threat (Azevedo et al., 2005; Bradley, Codispoti, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Hajcak et al., 2007). The current results may indeed relate to 
such an enhancement of activity in residual motor-related areas and future, 
electromyography or neuroimaging studies can specifically test such speculations and 
predictions.   
 
4.1. Limitations 
Our small sample size and the inherent limitations of the voxel-based lesion-symptom 
mapping approach (Rorden, 2007; Volle et al., 2011; Geva, 2012), only allow for 
preliminary evidence of the possible neural correlates observed. Nevertheless, our 
VLSM approach, compared to other lesion analysis methods, does offer several 
advantages, including the use of continuous scores of behavioural performance 
instead of the classification of patients into categorical groups. An additional 
limitation concerns the fact that we did not include a ‘neutral emotion’ or ‘no 
feedback’ control condition in our experiment, which we could compare with both 
negative and positive emotion conditions. In addition, we could not control for floor 
effects in the control group given the unique nature of anosognosia. Nevertheless, 
although there was a smaller margin for change in awareness scores for the control 
group, there was still a small change evident in the same direction as the AHP group. 
Furthermore, this control group allowed us to control for other more basic 
confounding effects such as age, test adherence, cognitive functioning, practice, 
repetition, comprehension and fatigue effects. 
 
Importantly, the observed changes were temporary and generated under specific 
experimental conditions, and thus the results of our experiment are not directly 
relevant to clinical studies. However, our findings do have indirect implications for 
clinical work; they reinforce the previously demonstrated link between awareness 
improvement and depressive feelings, as well as more generally emphasise the role of 
emotion in the syndrome, despite some patients’ apparent lack of emotional reactivity.  
 
4.2. Conclusion 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to conduct a systematic, experimental 
investigation of the relation between emotion and motor awareness in right-
hemisphere stroke patients with AHP.  We have shown that motor awareness is 
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sensitive to the induction of negative emotions in a social context, and this effect 
seems to relate to insular and striatal areas, and related white matter connections. We 
argued that neither pure psychodynamic, nor neurocognitive theories are sufficient to 
explain these results. Instead, we speculatively suggest that lesions to such regions 
may impair interceptive signals and neuromodulatory pathways associated with 
motivation. Ultimately, such deficits result in an inability to update prior beliefs about 
the self and affectively personalise new sensorimotor information.  
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Captions for Tables 
Table 1. Groups’ demographic characteristics and neuropsychological profile. 
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Figure	  1.	  Marginal	  means	  and	  interquartile	  range	  (error	  bars)	  of	  the	  change	  in	  awareness	  for	  the	  AHP	  (dark	  grey	  bars)	  and	  HP	  (light	  grey	  bars)	  groups	  after	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  emotional	  induction:	  *p	  <	  0.05.	  The	  Y-­‐axis	  indicates	  the	  change	  in	  awareness	  scores	  analysed	  by	  calculating	  the	  difference	  in	  awareness	  scores	  between	  each	  condition	  (post	  minus	  pre)	  for	  each	  group.	  Positive	  scores	  indicate	  an	  increase	  in	  awareness	  (i.e.	  less	  anosognosia)	  and	  negative	  scores	  indicate	  a	  decrease	  in	  awareness	  (i.e.	  more	  anosognosia).	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Figure	  2.	  Marginal	  means	  and	  interquartile	  range	  (error	  bars)	  of	  emotion	  ratings	  for	  AHP	  (Dark	  grey	  bars)	  and	  HP	  (light	  grey	  bars)	  groups	  after	  positive	  and	  negative	  mood	  induction:	  *p	  <	  0.05.	  The	  Y-­‐axis	  indicates	  the	  patient’s	  subjective	  mood	  ratings	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  zero	  to	  five	  (0	  =	  very	  unhappy;	  5	  =	  very	  happy).	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Figure 3. Group-level lesion overlay maps for patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia 
(AHP) and controls. A. Overlay of lesions in patients with anosognosia (AHP; n=8); B. 
Overlay of patients without anosognosia (n=7). C. Statistical analysis comparing the two 
populations of patients (AHP present-AHP absent; results are corrected for multiple 
comparisons, p <0.05 for Z >1.3).  
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Figure 4. Voxel-based (topological) lesion-deficit analysis. A. Damaged MNI voxels 
predicting the severity of unawareness of symptom deficits when covarying for lesion size 
(Feinberg scale, inverted, continuous measure; p <0.05 for Z >1.6449). B. Damaged MNI 
voxels predicting the change in awareness (differential scores, pre and post mood induction) 
when covarying for lesion size (continuous measure; p<0.05 for Z >1.6449). 
PrC=precentral, PoC=postcentral, SMG=supramarginal, STG+superior temporal gyrus, 
IFG=inferior frontal gryus, IC=internal capsule, MFG, middle frontal gyrus 
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